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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Hypothetical Case
“…Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”2
Dr. X is a young, charismatic, board-certified surgeon at the local hospital.3
While popular among her patients and non-surgical colleagues, to the established
surgical “Old Guard,” she appears somewhat of a threat. Her training in new,
advanced techniques, coupled with splendid bedside manner, has caused her practice

1
J.D. 2008, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A. 1993,
Case Western Reserve University; M.D. 1997, Case Western Reserve University School of
Medicine. The author wishes to thank his wife, Ann, his daughters, Juliette and Savannah, and
the rest of his family for their understanding, patience, and support. He also wishes to thank
his legal writing professors and mentors without whose guidance this would not have been
possible.
2
Lord Acton, Life of Mandell Creighton, in POWER QUOTES 247 (Daniel B. Baker, 1992).
3

The case of Dr. X is a fictional illustration. However, it is modeled after the typical
physician peer review lawsuit.
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to become quite busy. However, disruption in some well-established referral patterns
has occurred, and business has been siphoned away from her older colleagues.
Dr. Y is an endocrinologist at the same hospital.4 As Vice President of Medical
Affairs (VPMA), he is also a paid administrative agent of the hospital. Dr. Y is close,
both personally and professionally, to several of the “Old Guard” surgeons. They
express concerns about the negative impact Dr. X is having on their practices. Not so
subtly, they let Dr. Y know that if something is not done, they will probably start
moving their elective cases across the street to the local hospital’s competitor. Dr. Y,
in his VPMA capacity, is very concerned about the impact this would have on his
hospital’s bottom line.
When an untimely, perioperative complication lands Dr. X in front of a surgical
morbidity and mortality5 peer review, Dr. Y seizes his opportunity. Besides this
particular event, it also appears that Dr. X has had a few bad outcomes related to
some of her “new” surgical techniques, has been occasionally tardy in starting her
cases, and is significantly delinquent in completion of her medical records. The
physician peer review committee, composed of administrative-friendly and “Old
Guard”-sympathetic peers, votes to recommend suspension of Dr. X to the local
hospital’s governing board. As they do in nearly every instance, the Board adopts the
peer review committee’s recommendation. Dr. X is suspended.
Dr. X’s response to the suspension of her hospital privileges is to retain an
attorney and sue the hospital and the peer review board. Unfortunately for Dr. X, the
trial court’s ruling for summary judgment for the defense is affirmed on appeal; the
peer review committee and hospital are immune from civil liability under the federal
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), as well as applicable,
similar state provisions.
In the meantime, Dr. X’s suspension has been reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank,6 and she has been unable to acquire privileges at any other
hospitals. Thus stigmatized, she is considering giving up medicine altogether. The
tremendous time, effort and resources expended in the making of a physician will be
lost.7 Also left in the lurch are Dr. X’s patients, practically all of whom thought she
was an outstanding surgeon.
This hypothetical—but not uncommonly recurring—fact pattern demonstrates the
destruction of a promising medical career, elimination of competition, promotion of
4

Dr Y. is a fictional character.

5

Morbidity and Mortality reviews (usually referred to as “M and M’s”) are typically case
conferences where adverse patient outcomes (including death) are presented and evaluated.
6
The National Practitioner Data Bank, as created by the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, title IV, 100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
11101–11152 (2006)), created a national, centralized repository for the reporting of adverse
actions against physicians, including malpractice lawsuits, denial, or revocation of hospital
privileges and adverse outcomes of peer review investigations.
7

The time investment usually requires four years of undergraduate education, followed by
four years of medical school, followed by three to five years in residency, then possibly
additional time in a fellowship. The average medical school graduate has $150,000 or more in
debt, and gives up the additional opportunity costs of a higher paying job where average
annual residency salaries are roughly $40,000 a year. By comparison, a starting associate at a
law firm, after three years of law school, may command a salary of $80,000-100,000 a year.
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status quo cronyism, and protection of bad faith peer review, without a scintilla of
evidence that quality healthcare has been advanced in the process. Certainly, such
perverse consequences were not what Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon had in
mind when he introduced the HCQIA in 1986.8 Unfortunately, when policy
decisions supported by the weight of the law create both unfair and inequitable
results that trample physician property and due process rights, permit conflicts of
interest and abuse of process, and fundamentally harm the public interest, then the
question must be asked: is physician peer review immunity justified?
B. Thesis and Organization
Simply defined, physician peer review is the process whereby doctors evaluate
the quality of their colleagues’ work product in order to assure that prevailing
standards of care are being met.9 However, because physicians who serve on peer
review committees “make neither money nor friends,”10 Congress passed the HCQIA
and most state legislatures passed similar provisions providing immunity from civil
liability for peer review participants.11 Unfortunately, despite its good intentions and
intuitive attractiveness, physician peer review immunity represents a fatally flawed
policy whose time for revision has arrived. Because physician peer review immunity
is ineffective for its intended purpose, ripe for administrative abuse and offensive to
notions of due process and fundamental fairness, it should be abandoned before it
causes more harm.
Part II of this article describes the physician credentialing and peer review
process, then examine the rationale for the HCQIA and similar state statutes as well
as protections the law provides for the peer review process.12 Part III illuminates the
erroneous threshold assumption that undergirds the entire justification for physician
peer review immunity: specifically, that physician peer review is a competent and
capable tool for improving the quality of health care. In Part IV, this article evaluates
whether this legislation has been effective in achieving its purposes. Part V utilizes
recent and relevant case law to demonstrate exactly how physician peer review
immunity operates to disadvantage the aggrieved plaintiff physician, how it may be
subverted to the ulterior motivations of economic credentialing,13 and how it may
ultimately threaten rather than improve overall health care quality. Finally, in Part
VI, the article presents a comprehensive “de-immunized” approach to physician peer
8

Jack R. Bierig & Robert M. Portman, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 977 (1988).
9

George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial
Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723 (2001).
10
Matthew J. Cate, Physician Peer Review: Serving the Patient or the Physician?, 20 J.
LEGAL MED. 479, 480 (1999).
11

Lu Ann Trevino, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or Shield?, 22 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 331 (1997).
12

While HCQIA and similar state provisions are generally applicable to all entities
engaged in “professional review action,” this paper focuses on hospital-based physician peer
review immunity.
13

Economic credentialing essentially utilizes economic parameters (as distinct from
clinical competence) to make decisions regarding hospital privileges.
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review, which would make the system fundamentally more fair, substantially
increase physician participation, and achieve the outcome that is the fundamental
purpose of the entire process: improved quality of health care.
II. PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW
A. Physician Credentialing, Hospital Privileges and the Peer Review Process
With rare exception, having privileges to admit and treat patients in a hospital
setting is an indispensable element to a physician’s ability to practice his profession;
some specialties are almost exclusively practiced in the hospital arena.14 The process
an applicant physician goes through to receive hospital privileges is called
“credentialing.” Subsequently, peer review is the “ongoing process whereby the
facility monitors physicians’ practices to identify and remedy patterns of
unacceptable patient care.”15
Support for the physician peer review process is based on the intuitively logical
premise that only a physician’s colleague or peer would possess the expertise
appropriate to undertake such an evaluation.16 The actual peer review process
transpires in committees composed of physicians from a hospital’s medical staff. In
an effort to ensure impartiality, committee compositions generally include “an
unbiased hearing officer and practicing physicians who are not in direct economic
competition” with the reviewed physician.17 The peer review committees meet
regularly to review quality and performance data for individual physicians for
reappointment purposes and as needed to deal with physician incidents potentially
adversely affecting patient care.18 While not the ultimate decision-making body, the
peer review committee’s recommendations regarding privilege status form the basis
upon which the hospital’s governing body makes its final decision.19

14

Phillip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff
Peer Review Law at California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 301, 302 (2004). Specifically,
most radiologic, surgical, and interventional specialties are primarily hospital-based.
15

JONATHAN P. TOMES, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER REVIEW 9 (1994).

16

Newton, supra note 9, at 724.

17
Id. at 725. However, one of the inescapable realities of the peer review process is that
almost invariably it will be contaminated with conflict of interest problems. This problem will
likely only be magnified at smaller hospitals, which may not have a sufficiently large pool of
unbiased peer experts from which to recruit peer reviewers. Also, where a smaller number of
providers in a specialty and locale compete for the existing patient base, the economic
motivations for eliminating the competition will likely increase.
18
BYLAWS OF THE MEDICAL STAFF OF PARMA COMMUNITY GENERAL HOSPITAL (2002).
Reappointment to the Medical Staff occurs every two years.
19

Newton, supra note 9, at 725. A hospital’s governing body is generally composed of
nonmedical laypersons.
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B. Rationale for Physician Peer Review Immunity
In the wake of Patrick v. Burget,20 and premised on a finding that “there [was] an
overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging
in effective professional peer review,” Congress passed the HCQIA.21 With this
objective in mind, the HCQIA was the “legislative response to the medical
malpractice crisis” of its day.22 Concerned that state licensing boards, hospitals, and
medical societies were not effectively weeding out incompetent and impaired
physicians, the HCQIA sought to encourage and strengthen peer review activity by
granting a limited immunity from damages for liability arising from peer review
participation.23 Additionally, the HCQIA created a reporting requirement whereby
healthcare entities such as hospitals, insurers, and professional societies were
required to report malpractice payments and disciplinary actions to the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), operated by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, and in some cases to state medical boards.24
One of the largest deterrents to effective peer review at that time was the
perceived threat looming over physicians and hospital administrators that they may
be sued by a doctor that they were planning to discipline.25 In fact, testimony
received by the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment indicated that these
suits were having a “chilling effect” on effective peer review.26 Due to the threat of
retaliatory and often baseless litigation by an accused physician, hospitals and peer
review committees were reluctant to report physicians.27 In order to avoid the
possibility of lengthy, expensive, and uncertain litigation, hospitals would often
accept “voluntary” resignations from incompetent physicians in exchange for their
silence as to the reason for such resignation.28 Likewise, state medical boards would
engage in a form of “physician plea bargaining” by accepting the “voluntary”

20

486 U.S. 94 (1988). In Patrick, the plaintiff physician received a two million dollar jury
award after a finding that peer review proceedings had violated federal antitrust and state tort
laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but the United States Supreme Court
upheld the jury verdict.
21

Bierig & Portman, supra note 8, at 987.

22

Id. at 979.

23

Id. at 977. Exempted from the HCQIA immunity provisions are actions seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief; similarly exempted are claims based on civil rights
violations. Id. at 989.
24
Id. at 978. Besides the reporting requirement and immunity provisions, the third prong
of the HCQIA was a fee-shifting component intended to discourage physician plaintiffs from
bringing frivolous, retaliatory lawsuits after adverse peer review decisions. Id. at 1002. In
reality, even though most defendant hospitals and peer review committees win on summary
judgment due to HCQIA and state statutory immunity, rarely do courts find claims sufficiently
frivolous to trigger the shifting of attorney’s fees. Trevino, supra note 11, at 330.
25

See Bierig & Portman, supra note 8, at 983.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 981.

28

Id.
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surrender of a physician’s license in exchange for an agreement that the physician
would stop practicing in their state.29
While it was hoped that the reporting requirement would curb the undetectable
movement of incompetent or impaired physicians from state to state “free from any
accompanying record of incompetence or misconduct,”30 the immunity provision
was designed to allow peer review groups to “function more effectively in combating
the growth of the medical malpractice crisis.”31 In order to be eligible for protection
under HCQIA, peer review actions must meet four standards:
(1) [that peer review action is taken] in the reasonable belief that the
action was in furtherance of quality of care (2) after a reasonable effort to
obtain the facts of the matter (3) after adequate notice and hearing
procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other
procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in
the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known
after such reasonable efforts to obtain the facts.32
Furthermore, the Act establishes a “presumption” that the peer review action
meets the above criteria, “unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence.”33
C. Physician Peer Review Protections
Besides the federal protections afforded peer review via the HCQIA, practically
every state and the District of Columbia have sought to protect peer review activity
through the passage of statutes that “safeguard information acquired or generated in
the process.”34 These statutes generally provide protection of three different types:
privilege, confidentiality, and immunity.35 Privileges protect against discovery of
peer review records and proceedings.36 Confidentiality requires that “the parties
refrain from disclosing information to those outside the judicial proceeding.”37 State
immunity provisions operate similar to the HCQIA but provide varying levels of
protection.38 The states with the strongest protections cover the hospital and the peer
29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 983.

32

Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes Have Helped
Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 239, 246 (2001).
33

Id.

34

Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and Federal
Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 546 (2003).
35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 548.

38

Id.
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review committee, as well as those who testify or offer evidence. Besides providing
immunity for civil claims, some state statutes also protect against criminal liability
and antitrust actions.39
Thus shielded by significant federal and state protections, physician peer
reviewers should feel a certain degree of safety as they proceed with the discharge of
their duties.
III. PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW AS A TOOL TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE QUALITY
Unquestionably, there would be no HCQIA or similar state peer review
protections without the firmly held belief that physician peer review is fundamental
to improvements in health care quality. The notion that “peer review is essential for
ensuring quality medical care”40 has become such axiomatic dogma that it is virtually
impossible to read a review of this topic without encountering this presumption.41
Unfortunately, evidence to support such a fundamental conclusion is entirely lacking
and seriously undermines the legitimacy of physician peer review immunity.
In fact, published studies specifically examining the mechanics and outcomes of
physician peer review efforts consistently find ineffectiveness and inconsistency. At
the core of the difficulty for physician peer review is the basic lack of agreement on
what constitutes “quality of care.” While “no universally accepted norms for care or
physician behavior have been developed,”42 according to one researcher,
“[a]ppropriate care is usually defined in terms of processes such as diagnosis,
treatment and prevention of complications.”43 However, “[r]eviewers’ judgments of
quality … are influenced by factors other than sound processes of care.”44 Weingart
performed a retrospective, case-controlled Medicare database analysis and found that
physician reviewers “judged care much more harshly among cases with serious
adverse outcomes although the care was identical in each matched case.”45
Several other authors have studied physician agreement and peer review
reliability as to “quality of care.” Localio found that “assessments based on medical
records, especially when implicit and not guided by objective criteria, produce
disagreement among physicians on the appropriateness and quality of care.”46 A
39

Id. at 550.

40

Edward H. Livingston, M.D. & John D. Harwell, J.D., Peer Review, 182 AM. J.
SURGERY 103, 103 (2001).

OF

41
Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit—Is It Time
For a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (1999) (“The medical community and policy-makers
have widely accepted peer review of physicians as essential to encouraging high quality
medical practice.”).
42

Judith E. Orie, M.D., Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L.
REV. 437, 444 (1998).
43

Saul N. Weingart et al., Physician-Reviewers’ Perceptions and Judgments About
Quality of Care, 5 INT’L J. QUAL. HEALTH CARE 357, 357 (2001).
44

Id.

45

Id. (emphasis added).

46

A.R. Localio et al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of
Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 457
(1996).
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review by Goldman of twelve studies examining the inter-reviewer reliability of the
standard practice of peer assessment of quality of care found “agreement corrected
for chance to be in the range regarded as poor,” indicating that physician agreement
regarding quality of care to be only “slightly better than the level expected by
chance.”47 Even worse, “implicit professional reviews are … easily biased by
extraneous circumstances or information.”48 Thus, the preponderance of the scientific
evidence available on the subject of physician peer review reliability would indicate
a woeful inability to credibly and reproducibly assess “quality of care.”
The fiction of physician peer review as a useful tool to improve health care
quality, while perhaps startling and disheartening, is not altogether surprising.
Whenever subjective, value-laden terms such as “quality” and “standard of care” are
discussed, difference of opinion inevitably emerges. Such ephemeral, fluid concepts
not only vary by the subjective perspective of the individual doing the measuring
(such as the patient, the patient’s family, or the physician), but also change with the
passage of time. New advances in medications, treatments, and techniques constantly
raise the “standard of care” bar and adjust the concept of “quality care.”49
Nevertheless, the unassailable fact that physician peer review is a “poor” tool for
quality assessment and is reproducible hardly greater than “chance,” deals a serious
blow to the rationale upon which physician peer review immunity is founded.
Despite its wishful thinking, Congress should realize that the policy decision
favoring immunization of the physician peer review process only makes sense if its
fundamental assumptions about the process itself are actually sound.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION
In spite of the preceding facts, and thanks to a broader movement towards the
abrogation of privileges and immunities generally, Congress and state legislators
have endorsed a policy choice made between competing interests.50 While
simultaneously favoring the laudable policy of improving the quality of health care,
the protections afforded the peer review process exact “a social cost,” by adversely
affecting the interests of the peer review plaintiff.51
In order to sustain this imposition, some evidence should exist that these policies
actually accomplish their objectives.52 Unfortunately, there is no such evidence. Not
only is there a conspicuous absence of any proof of efficacy, evidence to the contrary

47
R.L. Goldman, The Reliability of Peer Assessments of Quality of Care, 267 JAMA 958,
958-60 (1992).
48

Kieran Walshe, Adverse Events in Health Care: Issues in Measurement, 9 QUAL.
HEALTH CARE 47, 51 (2000).
49

Id. at 48. Indeed, not only is the half-life of medical knowledge finite in terms of years,
but in fact, today’s “standard of care” may be tomorrow’s malpractice. Current thinking on
post-menopausal hormone replacement therapy for women provides a good example of this
conundrum.
50

Newton, supra note 9, at 734.

51

Id.

52

Scheutzow, supra note 41, at 8.
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indicates that physician peer review immunity has failed to improve overall health
care quality,53 and case law illuminates its harmful potential.54
First, although it would be quite difficult to measure and perhaps unreasonable to
expect that a given occasion of peer review would serve to advance the overall
interests of health care quality, it is nonetheless somewhat specious to claim that to
qualify for immunity “the [HCQIA] does not require that the professional review
result in actual improvement in the quality of health care, only that it was undertaken
in the reasonable belief that quality health care was being furthered.”55 Yet, despite
an inability to detect small incremental improvements on a case-by-case basis, it
would be reasonable to expect measurable aggregate improvement as justification for
peer review protection statutes. To date, however, “no exhaustive study has linked
the imposition of medical peer review statutes of any kind with a reduction in
medical error occurrences.”56
In fact, the only comprehensive study to examine the efficacy of peer review
protections found no positive relationship between the strength of state statutes and
the number of adverse peer review actions reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank.57 To arrive at this conclusion, researchers collected hospital data on peer
review activity and reporting and compared the degree of protection afforded the
peer review process with frequency of adverse peer review reporting.58 If peer review
protection laws were fulfilling their policy objectives, the logical expectation would
be to see more adverse peer review actions and subsequent NPDB reporting in states
with greater protections.59 The fact that this does not occur suggests that “such laws
are ineffective in accomplishing their public policy objective and should therefore be
eliminated or reformed.”60
Additional evidence for the failure of HCQIA and peer review immunity statutes
to advance quality health care can be inferred from reports from the Institute for
53

Id.

54

North Colorado Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Nicholas, 27 P.3d 828 (Colo. 2001). In
North Colorado, the court held that participants in the peer review process that resulted in the
suspension of invasive cardiologist Nicholas for inadequate medical chart documentation were
immune from suit and liability on state contract and tort claims. In reversing the judgment of
the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court found that NCMC’s peer review of Nicholas
was in accordance with HCQIA, notwithstanding the conclusion by the state Committee on
Anticompetitive Conduct that “Nicholas’s loss of privileges was initiated by the hostility and
anti-competitive feeling of another NCMC cardiologist, and ordered Nicholas’s invasive
cardiology privileges reinstated.” Id. at 833.
55

Fox v. Parma Community General Hospital et al., 160 Ohio. App.3d 409, 2005-Ohio1665, 827 N.E. 2d 787, at ¶33 (citing Moore v. Rubin, Trumbull App. No. 2001-T-0150,
2004-Ohio-5013) (emphasis added).
56

Fine, supra note 21, at 827.

57

Scheutzow, supra note 41, at 10 [hereinafter NPDB].

58

Id. The study devised a four-part classification continuum and assigned states and the
District of Columbia to a specific category based on the scope and degree of peer review
protections afforded. The categories ranged from “none” to “high.”
59

Id.

60

Id. at 8.
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Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and the Massachusetts Health Policy Forum. In the
wake of two landmark reports published by the Institutes of Medicine in 2001, the
IHI responded in December 2004 by launching the “100,000 Lives Campaign—a
national initiative with the goal of saving 100,000 lives among patients in hospitals
through improvements in the safety and effectiveness of health care.”61 The
Massachusetts Health Policy Forum likewise corroborated that “between 44,000 and
98,000 Americans die annually as a result of medical error,”62 and that in
Massachusetts alone between one and two thousand preventable deaths occur
annually.63 While immunity for physician peer review may not be the cause of these
medical error rates, it would seem to indicate that the improvement in quality health
care that Congress and state legislatures were banking on to justify that grant of
immunity in the mid and late 1980’s still has not materialized.
V. THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND COSTS OF IMMUNITY
A. Bad Faith Peer Review
Besides being a health care quality improvement failure, physician peer review
immunity may serve as a significant shield for bad faith peer review. Accusatory
physicians who are involved in the peer review process “are easily able to
manipulate the process to achieve ulterior motives, such as eliminating the economic
competition in a particular practice field.”64 And while the current peer review
process allows participants the protection to “practice arbitrary peer review with little
fear of repercussion,” the severely disadvantaged victim of bad faith peer review
faces an almost insurmountable uphill battle.65 The cases of Fox v. Parma
Community General Hospital66 and Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum
Health67 illustrate such suspect peer review.

61

Donald M. Berwick, MD, MPP, FRCP, et al., The 100,000 Lives Campaign—Setting a
Goal and a Deadline for Improving Health Care Quality, 295 JAMA 324, 324 (2006). The two
Institute of Medicine reports were To Err Is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm. A “life
saved” for the purposes of the campaign was defined as a “patient successfully discharged
from a hospital who, absent the changes achieved during the campaign, would not have
survived.” The campaign sought to have U.S. hospitals implement “6 highly feasible
interventions”: deploy rapid response teams; deliver reliable evidence-based care for acute
myocardial infarction; prevent adverse drug events through medication reconciliation; prevent
central-line infections; prevent surgical site infections; and prevent ventilator-associated
pneumonia.
62
David L. Fine, The Medical Peer Review Privilege in Massachusetts: A Necessary
Quality Control Measure or an Ineffective Obstruction of Equitable Redress? 38 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 811, 814 (2005).
63

Id.

64

van Geertruyden, supra note 32, at 253.

65

Id. at 252.

66

See Fox, supra note 55.

67

Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum Health, Trumbull App. No. 2003-T0136, 2004-Ohio-5108.
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In Fox, the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
for defendants after Fox, a general surgeon, had his privileges suspended and
brought suit for breach of contract, defamation, unfair competition, abuse of process
and tortious interference with business relationships.68 Despite facts that the peer
review board “did not identify quality-of-care issues” and found no mortalities in the
470 cases it reviewed, the appellate court upheld immunity based on the four-prong
HCQIA immunity test.69 In upholding Dr. Fox’s suspension for what practically
amounted to deficiencies of “medical record timeliness/documentation” and issues of
“utilization and length of stay,” the court noted that the HCQIA test for immunity is
an “objective test” and that “any purported bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendants is immaterial.”70 And even though the plaintiff produced expert testimony
which opined “that the peer review contained false, fraudulent, deceptive, and
misleading statements impugning the quality of care rendered by plaintiff,”71 the
court held defendants immune for “what is most fairly described as genuine
differences in opinion regarding the preoperative status of some of the patients, their
surgical or medical problems, [and] the best techniques for dealing with such
problems.”72
The holding in Fox, if not an outright endorsement of bad faith peer review and
economic credentialing, at least makes it clear that the court is reluctant to enter the
medical decision-making thicket and is quite content to render substantive
complaints moot by a finding of immunity under HCQIA.73 While physicians in
large groups or those otherwise politically well connected can often deflect
disciplinary actions, the Fox holding ought to send a shiver down the spine of those
less fortunately situated. Specifically, physicians new to a hospital staff, solo
practitioners, and physicians performing novel or different procedures make “an easy
target for those seeking to disqualify them from practicing in a hospital.”74
In Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum Health, pediatrician Catipay
brought suit after not being reappointed to the hospital’s medical staff, alleging
claims of tortious interference with a business relationship, breach of contract,
defamation and violation of public policy.75 The Ohio Eleventh District Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant
68
Fox v. Parma Community General Hospital, 160 Ohio. App.3d 409, 2005-Ohio-1665,
827 N.E. 2d 787, at ¶1-21.
69

Id. at ¶28-56.

70

Id. at ¶28-56.

71

Id. at ¶22.

72

Id. at ¶58.

73
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hospital by finding that Catipay had failed to establish that the hospital and trustees
had not made reasonable efforts to obtain the facts before taking professional review
action against him, and that the Board of Trustees’ decision to deny his application
for reappointment did not violate the HCQIA’s notice and hearing procedures.76
The substance of Catipay involved a “tumultuous relationship” between appellant
and his department head and the chairman of the Board, both of whom were fellow
pediatricians on staff at the hospital.77 Specifically, appellant had been openly critical
of the hospital and appellees over issues including “the hospital’s lack of a twentyfour hour pediatric house officer to aid in the resuscitation of distressed newborns”
and his department chief’s “refusal to serve a rotation on the house emergency
obstetrics schedule.”78 After a verbal altercation with Dr. Khavari, the department
chief, Khavari informed Catipay that she would not forward appellant’s
reappointment application to the Credentials Committee unless appellant completed
a physical and mental exam.79
After declining the offer to be examined, and without his department chief’s
report to the Credentials Committee, Catipay proceeded with his application for
reappointment.80 Despite the lack of the department chief’s report, the Credentials
Committee recommended to the Executive Committee “appellant’s reappointment
for a probationary period of one year.”81 The Executive Committee agreed with the
Credentials Committee and forwarded a recommendation for probationary
reappointment to the Board of Trustees. However, the Board declined to accept the
Executive Committee’s recommendation and instead decided to appoint an ad hoc
committee to review appellant’s reappointment.82 Following a two-hour meeting, the
ad hoc committee recommended to the Board that appellant not be reappointed to the
medical staff. The Board accepted that recommendation and suspended Catipay’s
privileges.83
In looking completely past the merits of appellant’s case, the Eleventh District
rejected Catipay’s assignment of error when it found that the Board was not
prohibited “from forming an ad hoc committee for the purpose of providing an
additional recommendation,” and that Khavari had not “exceeded her authority when
she demanded appellant submit to a mental health exam.”84 Further, in rejecting
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Id. at ¶3.
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appellant’s argument that the ad hoc committee did not make reasonable efforts to
obtain the facts, especially where it only met for two hours before making its
recommendation to the board, and where Catipay was not even told of the
appointment of the ad hoc committee nor interviewed by the committee, the court
concluded that “nothing in the HCQIA or the [Hospital] Bylaws require the Board to
notify a physician of the manner in which an investigation is being conducted, or to
participate in that investigation.”85
Beyond the glaring personal and economic conflicts of interest and the trampling
of basic due process rights, the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals apparently
had no qualms with a hospital board skirting bylaw procedures and refusing to take
“yes” for an answer, when what it preferred to hear was “no” from a secret ad hoc
committee. Further, by permitting physician peer review immunity to silence
physicians willing to expose legitimate hospital patient safety issues, the
bastardization of physician peer review immunity as a tool for the advancement of
health care quality is complete.
As for Dr. Catipay, perhaps he can take comfort in the knowledge that his case
did not come before the Ohio Seventh District Court of Appeals. That court has held
that “when reviewing whether an investigation was reasonable, courts do not require
that such an investigation be accurate and thorough.”86 But with an individual’s
professional livelihood hanging in the balance, perhaps they should.
Economic Credentialing
As alluded to in Fox, and in response to the currently upward spiraling costs of
health care, the practice of medicine is “undergoing an economic overhaul.”87 In an
attempt to rein in these costs, insurance companies as well as the federal government
have targeted physicians “as the principal point for cost containment.”88 And with
advances in information technology allowing hospitals to precisely measure
physicians’ past economic performance with respect to patient care, hospitals may
now “create financial and economic profiles of physicians that are ultimately used…
in credentialing.”89
But, while economic credentialing considers the impact a physician may have on
a hospital financially, “it completely disregards the competence, skill and quality of
the physician’s work.”90 Under economic credentialing considerations, a physician
may be excluded from hospital privileges for “treating too many poor patients, for
having privileges in a competing hospital, or for simply providing complete and
effective care.”91
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The American Medical Association (AMA) and other medical organizations are
“vehemently opposed to economic credentialing.”92 When it “creates inherent
conflicting loyalties for the physician, [who] must make a choice between the
patient’s well being and the cost of diagnostic procedures and treatment options that
will be reflected in his or her peer review,”93 the ethical and legal dilemmas become
obvious.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW WITHOUT IMMUNITY
“The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion.”94
While this Biblical aphorism is usually applied in evidence law to infer guilt
when an accused takes flight,95 this phrase seems to aptly apply to the physician peer
review process. Otherwise, why shroud the proceedings in secrecy and cloak the
reviewers in immunity? Given that physician peer review immunity fails its intended
purpose of improving health care quality, it is almost as certain that merely granting
immunity from civil liability does not assuage peer review participants’ concerns
regarding retaliatory litigation, especially considering the stakes for the aggrieved
physician plaintiff. Faced with an adverse peer review decision, most physicians will
fight for their professional lives. And as the United States Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, “the plain meaning [of HCQIA’s immunity provision] is that
professional review bodies and covered individuals … are immune from liability
only… the provision does not explicitly establish immunity from suit.”96
If physician peer review is to become the health care quality improvement device
that everyone, including Congress, hoped that it would, the time has come for a
major overhaul. But, can physician peer review be performed professionally and
competently without legislative immunity? I submit that the answer is “yes.” To do
so, I would suggest the following changes: physician peer review participation
should be a mandatory requirement for hospital privileges; non-peer and hospital
administration involvement in the peer review process should be eliminated or
significantly minimized; physician peer review participation should be indemnified
by the hospital or the state; and significant efforts need to be made to improve the
uniformity and reproducibility of the peer review process.
First, peer review involvement should be a mandatory requirement for hospital
privileges. All physicians should participate for a fixed term in a rotating capacity. In
this way, a degree of even-handed application of the process would be ensured, and
peer review power spread evenly throughout the medical staff. Cases should be
reviewed in a blinded fashion and/or conflicts of interest with reviewers determined
prospectively and prohibited.
Second, non-peer and hospital administration involvement in the physician peer
review process should be eliminated or at least substantially minimized. Given the
realities of economic credentialing and the financial pressures that hospitals face
92

Orie, supra note 42, at 442.
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Id. at 449.
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today, it is easy to see how hospital administrations may have economic or political
motivations which conflict with and tend to undermine the fairness of the peer
review process. Similarly, the use of non-peer case screeners should be strictly
scrutinized and made to apply prospectively defined, objective criteria to the cases
they preliminarily review.97
Third, physician peer review participants should be insured or indemnified by the
hospital or the state for their good faith peer review efforts. Since hospitals and the
state are already directly benefiting from the uncompensated efforts of peer
reviewers, it is not unreasonable for them to shoulder some of the cost. Thus, without
fear of retaliatory financial liability, physician participation would be encouraged
and enhanced. Similarly, an insurance fund could be established out of which
“victims” of “bad” peer review might be compensated.
Lastly, significant efforts need to be made to improve the scientific rigor applied
to the peer review process to make it less ambiguous and subjective. Peer review
outcomes need to be more reliable and reproducible if they are to create a palpable
improvement in health care quality. At a minimum, peer reviewers should have some
degree of education or training in the process. Just being a good physician does not
necessarily qualify one to be a good peer reviewer. The Continuing Medical
Education (CME) process would be an appropriate forum in which to give
physicians some training in the process. Since state licensing requirements already
specify fixed numbers of hours per licensing cycle,98 and most hospitals have
Continuing Education departments and sponsor CME activities,99 creating programs
that focus on improving the quality of work done by peer review committees should
not be difficult.
VII. CONCLUSION
Physician peer review is the process whereby physicians evaluate their
colleagues’ work product. Physicians in general are less than enthusiastic to perform
this function due to the lack of incentives and the fear of retaliatory litigation often
following an adverse peer review decision. Federal and state legislators created
statutory immunity for physician peer review participants in the hopes of advancing
effective physician peer review and improving health care quality.
Twenty years after the passage of HCQIA, there exists no data to indicate that
this policy is effective. To the contrary, the only palpable consequences are the social
costs being borne by individuals harmed by the granting of such immunity. Because
physician peer review immunity is a failed policy whose harms are unjustified, the
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time has come to abandon this approach and implement a fairer, more effective, deimmunized peer review process.

